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False memories are a frequently recurring problem in the 
courtroom and therefore research on this topic is highly 
needed. In the present study, 51 adolescents and 50 adults were 
tested to investigate the effect of testing on the vulnerability to 
misinformation. The main expectation was that these groups 
have different levels of susceptibility to misinformation. Using 
the Fuzzy Trace Theory as a framework, it was hypothesized 
that the testing effect influences these different levels of 
susceptibility to misinformation. On the first testing day, after 
viewing a video of a theft, participants received gist or verbatim 
questions. On day two, an eyewitness statement, manipulated 
with misleading information, was presented, after which 
participants received a final memory test on a verbatim level. 
It was found that (i) susceptibility to misinformation decreases 
with age and therefore adolescents were more vulnerable 
to misinformation than adults and (ii) the testing effect only 
applied when no misinformation was presented. Limitations 
might be that participants received forced choice questions and 
that there was no free recall, which occurs in real-life situations 
as police interviews. 
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A false memory is a recollection of events or experiences which is distorted or 
fabricated, and did not actually happen (Loftus, 1980). In general, there are 
two forms of false memories: spontaneous false memories and implanted false 
memories (reyna, 1995). Spontaneous false memories arise endogenously due to 
cognitive distortions (reyna & brainerd, 1998). On the other hand, implanted false 
memories result from exogenous misinformation. Misinformation after exposure to 
an event can affect the memory of that event and also memory reporting of details 
of that particular event. 
 Loftus, Miller, and burns (1978) introduced the so-called misinformation 
paradigm, which now is commonly used in studies where susceptibility of 
eyewitnesses to misleading post-event information is being investigated. research 
suggests that participants are more prone to suggestion if misinformation and 
misleading suggestions are reported in a memory test, compared to a control 
condition with no misinformation and misleading suggestions (Loftus, 1978). 
regardless of whether post-event information is misleading or consistent, this 
information is integrated into the event memory of a witness, which is called the 
misinformation effect (Loftus, 1978).
 The storage of event memory can be explained by the Fuzzy-trace theory 
(FTT). The FTT states that individuals who witness an event will derive two 
independent memory traces or representations of event details – verbatim and 
gist traces (brainerd, reyna & Ceci, 2008; rivers, reyna, & Mills, 2008). Verbatim 
representations store exact surface details of an event or experience (i.e., exact 
words and details of a story), whereas gist representations consist of meaning-based 
memory for the event or experience (i.e., the theme of a story) (Howe, Wimmer, 
Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009). Gist representations are superior to verbatim 
representations in memorability and accessibility (brainerd & reyna, 2001). More 
precise, gist processing is a favored retrieval mode over time and at immediate 
memory testing (Pansky & Koriat, 2004). 
 A study by bouwmeester and Verkoeijen (2011) suggests that gist traces 
strengthen even more when a memory test is conducted. The effect that taking 
a memory test improves retrieval of information is called the testing effect 
(roediger, Jacoby & McDermott, 1996; roediger & Karpicke, 2006a; roediger & 
Karpicke 2006b). The relation between the testing effect and the FTT is explained 
by the theory that the gist traces will strengthen because these traces are used to 
reconstruct and retrieve information from participants’ memory (bouwmeester and 
Verkoeijen, 2011). On the other hand, a study phase followed by a restudy phase 
will strengthen verbatim traces. In line with this argumentation, it is demonstrated 
that repetition and restudying can lead to a decrease of false memories due to the 
strengthened verbatim traces (brainerd, Payne, Wright, & reyna, 2003). The main 
question underlying the study of Pansky and Tenenboim (2011) is whether testing 
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can serve as a buffer for the susceptibility to misleading post-event information. 
They conclude that strengthened event memory on the verbatim level can inoculate 
against misinformation. On the other hand strengthening gist level memories did 
not decrease the effect of misinformation.
 The testing effect can have both a beneficial (Warren & Lane, 1995), and a 
detrimental (Chan, Thomas, & bulevich, 2009; Chan & Langley, 2011) influence on 
suggestibility to misinformation.  research has shown that when a test is preceded 
by misleading post-event information, the misinformation effect increases (Chan, 
Thomas & bulevich, 2009). More precisely, although the testing effect enhances 
memory of a witnessed event, retrieval practice can increase people’s suggestibility 
to manipulated information. This means that even though it has consistently been 
shown that correct recall improves by repeated testing, this testing could have a 
reversed effect when misinformation is introduced.
 The effect of misinformation on children is a recurrent point of discussion 
in the legal field. However, little research is available on this effect on adolescents. 
The current study focuses on the effect of misinformation in this age group. Still, 
it is important to consider children as a comparison group (brackmann, in prep.). 
recent research has shown that false memories increase between early childhood 
and young adulthood under certain circumstances (e.g., brainerd, 2013; Ceci & 
bruck, 1993). brainerd (2013) states that the risk to develop false memories increases 
drastically with age. Therefore, it is no longer justifiable to use the assumption 
that children’s testimonies, compared to adults’ testimonies, should in general be 
more infected with false memories. With regard to the developmental reversal it 
is important to note that this phenomenon only exists when adults have higher 
knowledge of meaning connections than children (Sutherland & Hayne, 2001).
 In the present study adolescents and adults were tested to investigate the 
effect of testing in combination with misinformation on false memories. It is a 
well-established finding that children’s memory relies less on gist representation 
compared to adults, and therefore children are expected to be less vulnerable to 
the production of false memories (reyna & Kiernan, 1994). It can be expected that 
memory processes and therefore production of false memories works differently 
in adolescents, than in adults. Decision-making (i.e., the cognitive process that 
results in the selection of a course of action out of alternatives) in adolescents is 
more intuitive and less computational compared to adults (rivers, reyna & Mills, 
2008). Adolescents find themselves between relying on verbatim analysis and 
relying on gist-based intuition (reyna & brainerd, 1995). In this study, the focus 
is on adolescents as nearly no study on this subject has been conducted that takes 
this age group into account (Jack, Leov, & Zajac, 2014). The research question is 
therefore: to what extent does testing have an effect on adolescents’ vulnerability to 
misinformation compared to adults? 
 It was hypothesized that (i) adolescents will be less vulnerable to misinformation 
compared to the adult sample in this study, due to less reliance on gist representation; 
(ii) according to the testing effect, performance should be improved on the items of 
the final memory test, that were tested (roediger, & Karpicke, 2006); and (iii) that 
the misinformation effect is expected to manifest itself in an impaired performance 
on items with misinformation in the final memory test, compared to items with no 





In total there were 101 participants (45 male participants), which is a subsample of the 
participants in the study of brackmann (in prep.). 51 adolescents (M=15.04, SD=.52, 
age range from 13.69 to 16.59) and 50 adults with (M=22.32, SD=1.99, age range from 
18.91 to 27.33) were tested. The different age groups were adjusted in order to make 
the different stages of development easy distinguishable. The verbatim condition 
included 26 adolescents and 27 adults, and the gist condition 24 adolescents and 24 
adults. Participants were recruited from secondary schools in the surroundings of 
Maastricht (The Netherlands), and Maastricht University. Adults were compensated 
for participation by receiving either one subject point or an Iris Cheque with a value 
of €7.50. The adolescent participants were tested at their secondary schools during 
class time. The adult group was tested in a lab at Maastricht University. Informed 
consents were obtained from students, and from parents or legal guardians, in case 
of under-age participants. In both age groups the division of participants in the gist-
testing or verbatim-testing group was counterbalanced.
Materials and procedure
Participants were tested individually on two consecutive days. On both days, test 
sessions lasted about fifteen minutes. At the start of each session, participants were 
told to concentrate and pay close attention as at the end of the session questions 
would be asked about the video. The first day, participants were presented with 
a video about an electrician entering a house to do chores and repair a list of 
electrical objects (see Takarangi, Parker, & Garry (2006) for a detailed description 
of the stimulus film). After a nonverbal filler task of approximately 3 minutes, the 
interpolated cued-recall task was presented to the participants. This task consisted 
of eight items with two questions each, one general question and one group specific 
question which was either gist- or verbatim-based. 
 After a 24-hour time interval, on day 2, participants received an audio version 
of an eyewitness account about the video which they viewed on day 1. In this 
eyewitness statement eight items were manipulated with misleading information 
(see Table 1). Four of these items were tested earlier in the interpolated cued-
recall task on day 1 and four items were not tested earlier. Afterwards there was 
a nonverbal filler task that served as a pause between the eyewitness account and 
the cued recall task. The cued recall task consisted of 18 questions on the verbatim 
level about the video of Eric the Electrician. besides the eight misinformation items, 
this final memory task included items that were not manipulated in the eyewitness 
account which were either neutral or verbatim. Neutral items were mentioned in 
the eyewitness account on a basic level and verbatim items were mentioned on a 
more detailed level. The questions in this cued recall task were presented in the 
same order for every participant, but were previously randomized by Takarangi et 
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al. (2006).  Lastly, the participant was asked not to tell details of the study to their 
classmates or other students until the study had finished and thanked for his or her 
participation. 
 It should be noted that in this particular study a forced-choice report was 
applied, which implies that participants cannot choose the level at which they 
report their memories. All questions were accompanied by two possible answers, 
which participants had to choose from. Both these cases of forced choice could 
have an effect on participants’ performance and therefore they should be taken into 
account when analyzing the data (Payne, Elie, blackwell and Neuschatz, 1996).
Table 1. Misinformation items in the cued-recall task on day 2.
Correct item displayed in the 
video on day 1
Misinformation item in the 
eyewitness account on day 2
Testing condition  in interpolated 
cued-recall task on day 1
Magazine Time
























Two age groups were compared: adolescents and adults. Age was considered as a 
between subjects factor. Participants engaged in an interpolated cued-recall task 
where half of the participants in each age group received questions on the gist level, 
and the other half received questions on the verbatim level. A between subjects 
comparison was made between gist representations and verbatim representations. 
A within subjects design was used to compare the influence of misinformation 
or no misinformation and the effect of tested and untested items on memory of 
participants in the final memory test. The within subject items of the final memory 
test consisted of four levels: tested misinformation x tested no misinformation x 
untested misinformation x untested no misinformation. The dependent variable of 
this study was the correct or incorrect answers participants gave on the final memory 
test. Concluding, this resulted in a 2 (age: 14-15, adults) x 2 (testing group: gist testing, 
verbatim testing) x 2 (testing condition: tested, untested) x 2 (misinformation 
condition: misinformation, no misinformation) mixed model design, with age and 





As in this study, both a between subjects design and a within subjects design were 
used, the collected data were analyzed with the use of a four-way mixed-model 
ANOVA. The between-subjects factors were represented by the interpolated-testing 
mode and age. The within-subjects factor was the misinformation condition and the 
test-condition. This resulted in a 2 (age: 14-15, adults) x 2 (testing group: gist testing, 
verbatim testing) x 2 (testing condition: tested, untested) x 2 (misinformation 
condition: misinformation, no misinformation) mixed model design.
 First, the responses of participants on the final memory test were compared 
by a function of age group, testing group, testing condition and misinformation 
condition. Table 2 presents the proportion of incorrect answers on the final memory 
test in each age group and condition. These data are used for the following analyses 
with a four-way mixed-model ANOVA.
 A significant main effect of testing condition was found, F(1, 204) = 72.489, p 
< .001, η² = .262 indicating an effect of tested versus untested items on performance 
on the final memory test. There was also a significant main effect of misinformation 
condition, F(1, 204) = 251.465, p < .001, η² = .552. Participants displayed impaired 
performance on items with misinformation in the eyewitness account compared to 
items with no misinformation. 
Table 2. Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of the proportion of incorrect answers on the final memory test 




condition Misinformation condition Age
14 – 15 years old Adults
M SD M SD
Gist Tested Misinformation .47 .32 .20 .22
No misinformation .03 .08 .05 .12
Untested Misinformation .53 .20 .26 .23
No misinformation .24 .20 .23 .20
Verbatim Tested Misinformation .41 .28 .20 .18
No misinformation .04 .08 .07 .11
Untested Misinformation .38 .20 .36 .20
No misinformation .25 .18 .18 .16
153Maastricht Student Journal of Psychology and Neuroscience
THE EFFECTS OF TESTING AND MISINFORMATION
 An interaction effect was found between the factors misinformation condition 
and age group, F(3, 204) = 7,870, p < .001, η² = .104. This indicated that the influence 
of misinformation in the eyewitness account on performance in the final memory 
test differs per age group. It was found that the effect of misinformation decreased 
with age, as illustrated in figure 1. Thus, performance on the final memory test 
of adolescents (14 to 15 years old) was more influenced by misinformation in the 
eyewitness account, compared to performance of adults (figure 1). The mean 
misinformation effect (y-axis) was higher as performance on the final memory 
test decreased. Analyzing the simple effects, it was indicated that within both age 
groups misinformation had a significant effect. When comparing age group 14 to 
15 year-olds (F(1, 208) = 85.86, p < .001, η² = .219) with adults (F(1, 208) = 14.89, p < 
.001, η² = .038) it could be concluded that adolescents were more influenced by the 
misinformation in the eyewitness account. 
Figure 1. The effect of misinformation compared to no misinformation per age group on the proportion of 
incorrect answers on the final memory test. The effect of misinformation was significant (p < .001) in both age 
groups. Error bars: 95% CI.
There was also an interaction effect for testing condition (tested vs. untested items) 
and misinformation condition (misinformation vs. no-misinformation items), F(1, 
204) = 27.682, p < .001, η² = .119. This effect of within subject manipulation showed 
that the misinformation in the eyewitness account influenced the effect of testing 
on performance on the final memory test (see also figure 2). The simple main effects 
show that when an item consists of misinformation, no testing effect is found in 
the performance on the final memory test (F(1, 207) = 3.04), p = .083, η² = .014). 
In other words, there was no significant effect for testing and misinformation. but 
when no misinformation was applied, an effect of testing was found (F(1, 207) = 
130.32, p < .001, η² = .380). Thus, the testing effect was only present when there was 
no misinformation presented in the eyewitness account. 
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Figure 2. The effect of testing and misinformation on performance on the final memory test. A higher level of 
performance on the test means more errors. A significant effect of testing was only found on items with no 
misinformation, when misinformation was presented no testing effect was found. Errors bars: 95% CI.
diSCuSSioN
The aim of this study was to examine the influence of the testing effect on the 
vulnerability to misinformation in adolescents and adults. Emphasis was put 
on adolescents as most studies have focused on children and adults. It was 
hypothesized, in line with FTT (rivers, reyna, & Mills, 2008), that adolescents are 
more vulnerable to misinformation than adults. The vulnerability of different age 
groups depends on the paradigm being used in a study. Children are more prone to 
suggestive information, while adults are more prone to spontaneous false memories 
(Otgaar, 2013).
 The current study shows that adolescent participants are more susceptible to 
misinformation than adults. When misinformation was introduced both groups 
showed impaired performance, although adolescents’ performance on the final 
memory test was more impaired than the performance of the adults. The study of 
brackmann (in prep.), which is related to the present study, showed that children are 
more susceptible to misinformation than adults. Those findings are in controversy 
with the recent developmental reversal, but it should be noted that a developmental 
reversal is only present when adults have higher knowledge of meaning connections 
than children. This assumption could be an explanation for the increased effect of 
misinformation in children (brackmann, in prep) and in adolescents, in this study, 
155Maastricht Student Journal of Psychology and Neuroscience
THE EFFECTS OF TESTING AND MISINFORMATION
compared to adults. When combining the results of both studies, it is indicated 
that adolescents can be located between children and adults on a continuum of 
susceptibility to misinformation. Further research could focus on including a greater 
extent of age groups, which should give a more complete picture on the distribution 
of different age groups with respect to susceptibility to misinformation.
Another important finding of this study is that, when age is held constant, the 
testing effect is dependent on the misinformation condition. It shows that an 
effect of interpolated testing on performance on a memory test only exists when 
no misinformation is presented. It is remarkable that when misinformation is 
presented, no testing effect is observed. This implies that the testing effect does 
not occur when someone is influenced by misinformation. In relation to this it can 
also be stated that, regardless of the testing effect, participants’ performance on 
the final memory test was negatively influenced by misinformation as the error rate 
increased with the application of misinformation.
 As the FTT states that the suggestibility to misinformation increases when 
relying more on gist representations compared to verbatim representations (rivers, 
reyna & Mills, 2008), an interaction between misinformation and testing group was 
expected. However, no support for this hypothesis was found in the present study. 
The interaction effect of testing group and misinformation did not appear to have 
an influence. It was expected that the difference between gist and verbatim testing 
on the first day would influence the performance on the final memory test after the 
misleading post-event information.  This can also be linked to age, because children 
rely less on gist representations compared to adults and are therefore, in line with 
the developmental reversal, considered to be less suggestible to false memories 
(e.g., brainerd, reyna, & Ceci, 2008; reyna & Kiernan, 1994). Although the FTT 
sets out that children rely less on gist representations, the results of the overarching 
study (brackmann, in prep.) point out that children are more vulnerable to the 
misinformation effect. It is therefore assumed that the hypothesized effect of gist 
and verbatim testing on the vulnerability to misinformation might not apply.
 A limitation of the current study is that participants were forced to report 
their answers on either gist or verbatim level. In real-life situations, such as a police 
interview, respondents have the option to choose the level on which they report 
information (Payne, Elie, blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996). As discussed by Payne 
et al. (1996) the forced-choice answer format could affect the performance on a 
memory test, because a forced-choice report could lead to an increased proportion 
of errors. In addition to the fact that participants were divided into separate 
conditions of report, they were prompted to choose one of the two answer options 
that accompanied the questions. The absence of the possibility for free-recall of 
memories could have influenced participants’ performance, or at least might 
differentiate participants’ performance from performance in an interview setting. 
 The conclusion of this study is that susceptibility to misinformation increases 
with age, and adolescents are more susceptible to misinformation than adults. 
Furthermore, the testing effect only applied when there was no misinformation. 
When misinformation comes into play, the testing effect cannot be found. A 
suggestion for additional research is to more extensively examine the relation 
between misinformation and testing. by including an adolescent age group, this 
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study raises an important area of development in the research on false memories, as 
there is only limited research on this age group. It is important to expand studies on 
the effect of misinformation on adolescents.
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